

TOWARDS LAW-AWARE SEMANTIC CLOUD POLICIES WITH EXCEPTIONS FOR DATA INTEGRATION AND PROTECTION

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Motivations

- 1 Current cloud infrastructures do not provide enough automatically self-managed services.
- 2 In order to seek technology innovation on Software-as-a-service (SaaS), we apply semantic web technologies for cloud computing.
- 3 Automatically self-managed SaaS is not only for automatic allocation of cloud resources, but also for enforcing security and privacy policies.
- 4 *Law-as-a-Service (LaaS)* further enhances security and privacy policy representation and enforcement in the cloud.



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- 1 How to empower semantic technologies for cloud computing to provide law-aware semantics-enabled cloud policies?
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- 3 How to use semantic legal policies to interpret laws and ensure the legality of data sharing and protection across jurisdictions?
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Contributions

- 1 A law-aware semantic cloud policy infrastructure has been established to verify the feasibility of LaaS concepts.
- 2 Semantic legal policies for data integration and protection are designed and enforced in a super-peer architecture.
- 3 Constructing multiple super-peer domains to verify semantic legal policies across jurisdictions.
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
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A Law-Aware Semantic Policy Infrastructure (conti.)



Logical Cage Model vs. Legal Cage Model

- A TVD is a *logical cage* model, which consists of a set of distributed virtual machines (VMs), storage for the VMs, and a communication medium interconnecting the VMs [6].
- A TLD is a *legal cage* model, which determined by a specific law, to regulate virtual legal boundary of data disclosure and usage.
- TLD concepts are modeled as a taxonomy of laws, where a type of law and an effective judicial domain are two factors to decide whether a data request is allowed.



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Semantic Legal Policies as Logical Theories [5]

- Semantic legal policies are expressed as logical theories for information queries, and context are sets of ground facts that fed into policies for outputs.
- Semantic legal policies are mapping from a data usage context to access control decisions, such as permit, deny, and error.
- A data usage context comprises a user's role along with his/her personal properties, resources metadata, access time, access location, purpose, and action, etc.
- Once a user's data usage context is satisfied with the domain policy of a TLD, the semantic legal policies of this TLD are identified and executed.
- Semantic legal policy outputs (or query answers) are also encoded as logical formulas for authorization.



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


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Related Work

Several categories are related to this study:

- Multi-tenant cloud services: Abbadi [1], Cabuk [6], Eberhart [13], Foresti [16], Haase [20], Hu [25].
- Peer data management: Beneventano [3], Calvanese [7], Halevey [21] [22], Hu [27], Madhavan [31].
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A super-peer specifies its legal semantic policies based on a type of law from a jurisdiction within a super-peer domain:

- A Peer Data Management System (PDMS) is the best way to achieve wide-scale data integration over the Internet.
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Possible semantic mappings from local schemas to global schema:

- Global-As-View(GAV): expressing each concept in the global schema as queries over the data sources.
- Local-As-View(LAV): expressing each concept in the data sources as a query (or view) over the global schema.
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Principles of Data Protection Laws

Three principles of data protection laws for cloud computing:

- *Registration* principle: location of service provider registration, which enables data collection services.
- *Nationality* principle: nationality of the data owner whose data are being used.
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- 1 offer LaaS for Cloud Service Providers (CSPs) while integrating semantic data modeled as ontologies from multiple data sources.
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A Super-Peer Data Cloud System

A super-peer data cloud system is a set of super-peer domains

$\Pi = \{\pi_1, \dots, \pi_n\}$, where

- Each super-peer domain π_i corresponds to a TLD.
- Grouping a set of peers into a super-peer domain and organize them into a two-level architecture: peers and super-peer.
- The super-peer is a guardian, which integrates all of its local peers' ontologies into a global ontology through ontology mapping, alignment, and merging.
- Semantic global mappings are also possible from the current *Super - peer $_{\alpha}$* to interlink with another *Super - peer $_{\beta}$* .
- Semantic legal privacy policies enforcement is posed to a super-peer that provides data integration and protection services.



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Semantics of a TLD

A super-peer domain $\pi_\alpha \in \Pi$, corresponding to a TLD_α , can be defined as a tuple $(P_\alpha, SPD_\alpha, GS_\alpha, LS_{peer_i}, M_\alpha, DS_\alpha)$:

- A super-peer sp_α is the only node in a super-peer domain $\pi_\alpha \in SPD_\alpha$, which allows an $agent_\alpha$ to enforce semantic legal policies.
- Through local LAV mapping assertions, a global schema GS_α provides an integrated view for a set of peers from $P_\alpha = \{peer_1, \dots, peer_n\}$.
- A set of peers from P_α are mediators. A peer $p_i \in \pi_\alpha$ maps its local ontology schema, LS_{peer_i} , to a set of relational data sources, ds_i , from $DS_\alpha = \{ds_1, \dots, ds_m\}$.
- A set of local mapping assertions, M_α , created from a mapping language, ML , are used to semantically link between a super-peer sp_α and a set of peers.
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- Through local LAV mapping assertions, a global schema GS_α provides an integrated view for a set of peers from $P_\alpha = \{peer_1, \dots, peer_n\}$.
- A set of peers from P_α are mediators. A peer $p_i \in \pi_\alpha$ maps its local ontology schema, LS_{peer_i} , to a set of relational data sources, ds_i , from $DS_\alpha = \{ds_1, \dots, ds_m\}$.
- A set of local mapping assertions, M_α , created from a mapping language, ML , are used to semantically link between a super-peer sp_α and a set of peers.
- A set of local data sources, ds_i , from DS_α , are relational structure data that store materialized data instances.



Semantics of Multiple TLDs

A super-peer domain π_α for TLD_α is related to another super-peer domain π_β for TLD_β through:

- A set of super-peer's GLAV semantic mapping assertions

$$CQ_{\pi_\beta}(sp_\beta) \rightsquigarrow CQ_{\pi_\alpha}(sp_\alpha)$$

where $CQ_{\pi_\beta}(sp_\beta)$ and $CQ_{\pi_\alpha}(sp_\alpha)$ are conjunctive queries over the super-peer sp_β and super-peer sp_α .

- A Datalog rule is a mapping assertion of GLAV:

$$H \leftarrow B_1 \wedge B_2 \wedge \dots \wedge B_n$$

where H , query results (or views) are from the source of sp_α 's global ontology schema, and rule antecedent B_i , is a pattern matching specification from target sp_β 's global ontology schema.



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Semantic Legal Policy Representation

- 1 A semantic legal policy is created from a policy language, and a semantic legal policy language is shown as a combination of ontology language and rule language.
- 2 A semantic legal policy is composed of ontologies and rules, where ontologies are created from an ontology language and rules are created from a rule language.
- 3 Currently, OWL-DL is used for policy ontology and stratified Datalog with negation, e.g., $Datalog^{\neg}$, rules are used for defeasible rules reasoning.
- 4 The research challenging is how to integrate two families of logics, description logic (DL) and logic program (LP), for a semantic legal policy representation and enforcement under non-monotonic semantics.



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
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Policy Ontology for a Super-Peer Domain

Semantics of a super-peer data cloud includes two modular concepts:

- 1 super-peer domain
- 2 domain policy and data policy



Semantic Legal Policy Enforcement

- Balancing policy expressive power and computational complexity from integration of ontologies and rules.
- OWL-DL with positive unary and binary datalog rule from SWRL is not capable for a policy's exceptions handling.
- How about using different species of DL-Lite, e.g. $DL - Lite_A$, $DL - Lite_F$, $DL - Lite_R$ integrated with extended Datalog, $Datalog^{+-}$, for a semantic legal policy enforcement?
- Consider seriously about policy enforcement criteria in terms of computational complexity, such as undecidable vs. decidable, intractable vs. tractable, etc.



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Semantic Legal Policies

A Domain Policy's Ontology

A PARTIAL ONTOLOGY FOR A DOMAIN POLICY

```

hasTLD.DomainPolicy(dmp),hasTLD-.TLD(tld).
hasCondition.DomainPolicy(dmp),
hasCondition-.Condition(dmc).
hasPartOf.Condition(dmc),
hasPartOf-.Purpose(checkIn),
hasPartOf-.DataUser(airlineStaff),
hasPartOf-.Action(read).
hasPartOf-.Location(TW),
hasPartOf-.Consent( $\top$ ).
= 1 hasSuperPeer-.Super – Peer(sp),
 $\exists$ hasPeers.Peer(p),
 $\forall$ registerAt.Peer(p),
 $\exists$ registerAt-.Super – Peer(sp).

```



Semantic Legal Policies (conti.)

A Domain Policy's Rules (conti.)

LINK BETWEEN TLD AND SPD

$$\text{DomainPolicy}(\text{?dmp}) \wedge \text{hasTLD}(\text{?dmp}, \text{?tld}) \wedge \text{correspondTo}(\text{?tld}, \text{?spd}) \wedge \text{SPD}(\text{?spd}) \\ \rightarrow \text{domainPolicyForSPD}(\text{?dmp}, \text{?spd}) \leftarrow (1)$$

REQUEST FOR AN SPD

$$\text{Request}(\text{?r}) \wedge \text{hasCondition}(\text{?r}, \text{?c}) \wedge \text{Condition}(\text{?c}) \\ \wedge \text{DomainPolicy}(\text{?dmp}) \wedge \text{hasCondition}(\text{?dmp}, \text{?dmc}) \wedge \text{Condition}(\text{?dmc}) \\ \wedge \text{isSubsumed}(\text{?c}, \text{?dmc}) \wedge \text{domainPolicyForSPD}(\text{?dmp}, \text{?spd}) \\ \rightarrow \text{getInTo}(\text{?r}, \text{?spd}) \leftarrow (2)$$

Semantic Legal Policies (conti.)

A Domain Policy's Rules (conti.)

LINK BETWEEN TLD AND SPD

$$\text{DomainPolicy}(\text{?dmp}) \wedge \text{hasTLD}(\text{?dmp}, \text{?tld}) \wedge \text{correspondTo}(\text{?tld}, \text{?spd}) \wedge \text{SPD}(\text{?spd}) \\ \longrightarrow \text{domainPolicyForSPD}(\text{?dmp}, \text{?spd}) \longleftarrow (1)$$

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Semantic Legal Policies

A Data Policy's Ontology (conti.)

A PARTIAL ONTOLOGY FOR A DATA POLICY

```
isBelongedTo.DataPolicy(dap),  
isBelongedTo.DomainPolicy(dmp).  
hasPII.Data(da), hasPII.PII,  
hasPFlightInfo.PII(pii),  
hasPFlightInfo.PersonalFlightInfo(fInfo).  
hasPartOf.PersonalFlightInfo(finfo),  
hasPartOf.Name(name),  
hasPartOf.PassportNo.(pano),  
hasPartOf.Nationality(citizenship),  
hasPartOf.FlightNo.(fno),  
hasPartOf.Date(date).  
hasPartOf.Address(addr).  
hasPartOf.PhoneNo.(pono).
```



Semantic Legal Policies (conti.)

A Data Policy's Rules (conti.)

SUPER-PEER HAS ITS OWN PEERS

$$\text{SPD}(\text{?spd}) \wedge \text{hasSuperPeer}(\text{?spd}, \text{?sp}) \wedge \text{Super} - \text{Peer}(\text{?sp}) \wedge \text{hasPeers}(\text{?spd}, \text{?p}) \\ \wedge \text{Peer}(\text{?p}) \wedge \text{registerAt}(\text{?p}, \text{?sp}) \longrightarrow \text{hasOwnPeers}(\text{?sp}, \text{?p}) \longleftarrow (3)$$

SUPER-PEER IS ALLOWED TO DISCLOSE PII

$$\text{Super} - \text{Peer}(\text{?sp}) \wedge \text{hasOwnPeers}(\text{?sp}, \text{?p}) \wedge \text{Peer}(\text{?p}) \wedge \text{canFind}(\text{?p}, \text{?da}) \\ \wedge \text{Data}(\text{?da}) \wedge \text{hasPII}(\text{?da}, \text{?pii}) \wedge \text{PII}(\text{?pii}) \\ \longrightarrow \text{hasDisclosedFor}(\text{?sp}, \text{?pii}) \longleftarrow (4)$$

Semantic Legal Policies (conti.)

A Data Policy's Rules (conti.)

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$$\text{SPD}(\text{?spd}) \wedge \text{hasSuperPeer}(\text{?spd}, \text{?sp}) \wedge \text{Super} - \text{Peer}(\text{?sp}) \wedge \text{hasPeers}(\text{?spd}, \text{?p}) \\ \wedge \text{Peer}(\text{?p}) \wedge \text{registerAt}(\text{?p}, \text{?sp}) \longrightarrow \text{hasOwnPeers}(\text{?sp}, \text{?p}) \longleftarrow (3)$$

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Semantic Legal Policies (conti.)

A Data Policy's Rules (conti.)

A DATA POLICY FOR AN SPD

$$\text{DataPolicy}(\text{?dap}) \wedge \text{isBelongedTo}(\text{?dap}, \text{?dmp}) \wedge \text{DomainPolicy}(\text{?dmp}) \\ \wedge \text{domainPolicyForSPD}(\text{?dmp}, \text{?spd}) \longrightarrow \text{dataPolicyForSPD}(\text{?dap}, \text{?spd}) \longleftarrow (5)$$

REQUEST CAN USE PII

$$\text{Request}(\text{?r}) \wedge \text{getInTo}(\text{?r}, \text{?spd}) \wedge \text{satisfy}(\text{?r}, \text{?dap}) \wedge \text{DataPolicy}(\text{?dpa}) \\ \wedge \text{dataPolicyForSPD}(\text{?dap}, \text{?spd}) \wedge \text{SPD}(\text{?spd}) \wedge \text{hasSuperPeer}(\text{?spd}, \text{?sp}) \\ \wedge \text{hasDisclosedFor}(\text{?sp}, \text{?pii}) \longrightarrow \text{canUse}(\text{?r}, \text{?pii}) \longleftarrow (6)$$


Semantic Legal Policies (conti.)

A Data Policy's Rules (conti.)

A DATA POLICY FOR AN SPD

$$\text{DataPolicy}(\text{?dap}) \wedge \text{isBelongedTo}(\text{?dap}, \text{?dmp}) \wedge \text{DomainPolicy}(\text{?dmp}) \\ \wedge \text{domainPolicyForSPD}(\text{?dmp}, \text{?spd}) \longrightarrow \text{dataPolicyForSPD}(\text{?dap}, \text{?spd}) \longleftarrow (5)$$

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Unifying Two Types of Policies

Privacy Protection and National Security

- 1 We manually unify two types of semantic legal policies, translated from privacy protection law and national security law.
- 2 Privacy protection law α and national security law β are unified at *Super – peer* $_{\alpha\cap\beta}$ at $TLD_{\alpha\cap\beta}$, where $TLD_{\alpha\cap\beta}$ is in the intersection of TLD_{α} and TLD_{β} jurisdiction
- 3 Database is in compliance with a data protection law α from one jurisdiction but data centers hosting database are possibly in compliance with national security law β from another jurisdiction.



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
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Unifying Semantic Legal Policies at $Super - peer_{\alpha \cap \beta}$



Query at Intersection of TLDs

Two types of queries are available: subject-based and pattern-based:

- 1 At *Super* – $peer_{\alpha \cap \beta}$, only provides pattern-based queries, at *Super* – $peer_{\alpha}$ and *Super* – $peer_{\beta}$ we provide both.
- 2 A guardian agent in *Super* – $peer_{\alpha \cap \beta}$ only grants anonymization pattern-based queries, so PII cannot be fully disclosed.



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Stratum One Exception: A Data Owner's Consent

NO DATA DISCLOSURE UNLESS A DATA OWNER'S CONSENT

Ab1 \rightarrow hasPartOf.Condition(Ab1)
hasPartOf.Condition(Ab1),

$$Ab1 = \begin{cases} hasPartOf^-.Purpose(\neg nationalSecurity) \\ hasPartOf^-.DataUser(\neg securityOfficer) \\ hasPartOf^-.Consent(\top) \end{cases}$$

Stratum Two Exception: Without a Data Owner's Consent

DATA DISCLOSURE WITHOUT A DATA OWNER'S CONSENT

Ab2 \rightarrow hasPartOf.Condition(Ab2)
hasPartOf.Condition(Ab2),

$$Ab2 = \begin{cases} hasPartOf^-.Purpose(nationalSecurity) \\ hasPartOf^-.DataUser(securityOfficer) \\ hasPartOf^-.Consent(\perp) \end{cases}$$


Stratum Three Exception: Citizenships are the Criteria

DENY DATA DISCLOSING IF NOT A LOCAL CITIZEN

Ab3 \rightarrow hasPartOf.Condition(Ab3).
hasPartOf.Condition(Ab3),

$$Ab3 = \begin{cases} hasPartOf.Condition(Ab2) \\ \dots \\ hasPartOf^-.Nationality(\neg TW - citizenship) \end{cases}$$

A Policy's Exceptions Handling in $SPD_{\alpha \cap \beta}$



Stratified *Datalog*⁻ Rule for Policy Exceptions Handling

COMPLYING WITH TWO TYPE OF LAWS

```
Request(?r) ∧ hasCondition(?r, Ab1) ∧ Condition(Ab1)
∧ DomainPolicy(?dmp) ∧ hasCondition(?dmp, ?dmc) ∧ Condition(?dmc)
∧ isSubsumed(Ab1, ?dmc) ∧ domainPolicyForSPD(?dmp, ?spd)
→ getInTo(?r, ?spd)
```

Conclusion

- 1 A semantic privacy preserving model provides legalized data integration and protection services in semantic cloud.
- 2 Law-as-a-Service (LaaS) overcomes legal obstacles when Cloud Service Providers (CSPs) intend to deploy their cloud resources and services.
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Future Work

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- Exploiting expressive power and computational complexity of semantic legal policy enforcement under different ontologies and rules integration.
- After direct mapping from a RDB's tables to modular ontologies, through fragmentation and encryption techniques to ensure the data protection criteria of outsourcing in the cloud.
- Using tremendous amount of RDB data sets as ontology's data sources to verify sustainability of LaaS.



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LaaS System Demo and Q&A

LAAS SYSTEM DEMO. AND Q&A

- LaaS System Demo.
- Q&A



LaaS System Demo and Q&A

LAAS SYSTEM DEMO. AND Q&A

- LaaS System Demo.
- Q&A



Ent Lab. at NCCU in Taiwan

Home Peer SPD Laas Test Trust Virtual Domain -

[National Taiwan University Hospital](#)
[Center of Disease Control in Taiwan](#)
[National Immigration Agency](#)
[The Taipei Government](#)
[National Security Bureau](#)
[Taipei District Prosecutors Office](#)
[Acet](#)

Center of Disease Control in Taiwan

Welcome! Lin(logout)

Notification Unit	Report Number	disease type	Law Verify	Confirm
National Taiwan University Hospital	2	H1N1	<input type="button" value="Law Verify"/>	<input type="button" value="Confirm"/>

α/β domain

National Taiwan University Hospital

Name	BirthDay	Nationality	Gender	ID	Hospital	Medicalrecordnumber	Disease	Disclose
Ding Yi-Jhong	19681114	Taiwin	M	K145698758	National Taiwan University Hospital	005	H1N1	0

	PreventHarm_1	Article	Content
Exception	Personal_Information_Protection_Act_C3-3	16	Where it is to prevent harm on the life, body, freedom or property of the Party,
Law	Enforcement_Rules_of_the_Communicable_Disease_Control_Act_16	16	In accordance with regulations of Paragraph 4, Article 39 of the Act, require medical institutions, physicians, or forensic medicine physicians to provide within a definite time, relevant information of patients of communicable diseases,

LaaS System Demo(2)

Ent Lab. at NCCU in Taiwan

home Peer SPD LaaS Test Trust Virtual Domain

Communicable Disease Control Medical Network SPD
 Lin(logout)
 Security SPD

Center of Disease Control in Taiwan

Notification Unit	Report Number	Law Verify
National Taiwan University Hospital	1	Law Verify

af/b domain

National Taiwan University Hospital

Name	BirthDay	Nationality	Gender	ID	Hospital	Medicalrecordnumber	Disease	Disclose
Ding Yi-fhong	19681114	Taiwan	M	K145698758	National Taiwan University Hospital	005	H1N1	0

[Show Law](#)
[Show XML](#)

af/b domain

The Government of Taipei

name	bday	phone	city	address	id	gender	fname	lname	disclose
Wu Yi-fhong	19681114	02-22665600	Taipei City	Rm. 1, 2F., No.34-2, Mingqun W. Rd., Datong Dist.,	K145698758	M	Wu Langley	Guo Wo	

[Show Law](#)
[Show XML](#)

PreventItem_2	Article	Content
European Personal Information Protection Act_C3-3	36	Where it is to prevent harm to the life, body, freedom or property of the Party.
Law Enforcement Rules of the Communicable Disease Control Act_16	16	In accordance with regulations of Paragraph 4, Article 39 of the Act, require medical institutions, physicians, or forensic medicine physicians to provide within a definite time, relevant information of patients of communicable diseases.

PreventItem_1	Article	Content
European Personal Information Protection Act_C1-5	8	When the notice will require the government agency in performing its official duties.
Law Enforcement Rules of the Communicable Disease Control Act_16_2	16	In accordance with regulations of Paragraph 4, Article 39 of the Act, require medical institutions, physicians, or forensic medicine physicians to provide within a definite time, relevant information of patients of communicable diseases.

Ent Lab. at NCCU in Taiwan

Home Peer SPD Laas Test Trust Virtual Domain ▾

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[Acer](#)

National Security Bureau

Welcome! Li(logout)

Search ID
 ReportNumber
 Name

Key

Search warrant - National Taiwan University Hospital

β domain

National Taiwan University Hospital

Name	BirthDay	Nationality	Gender	ID	Hospital	Medical record number	Disease	Disclose
Ding Yi-Jhong	19681114	Taiwan	M	K145698758	National Taiwan University Hospital	005	H1N1	0

	NationalSecurity_I	Article	Content
Exception	Personal_Infomation_Protection_Act_C1-5_5	8	when the notice will impair the government agency in performing its official duties,
Law	The_Constitution_of_The_Republic_of_China_137_4	137	The national defense of the Republic of China shall have as its objective the safeguarding of national security and the preservation of world peace. The organization of national defense shall be prescribed by law



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